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The tax treatment of contingent attorney's fee arrangements has
been the subject of significant debate and controversy.! In
employment and civil rights lawsuits, the alternative minimum tax
(AMT)2 may cause a plaintiff's ultimate recovery to be taxed at rates
significantly higher than the current maximum rate of 35 percent . In
fact, if the ratio of attorney's fees and costs to the overall settlement
amount is high enough, a plaintiff can be taxed on her net recovery4 at
a rate higher than one hundred percent.5 In other words, this AMT
trap may result in a victorious plaintiff owing an amount in taxes
6greater than her net recovery.
I and other commentators have noted that this tax trap clearly
violates tax policy principles.' Furthermore, Professors Laura Sager
and Stephen Cohen have argued persuasively that the trap
"undermines the national policy of encouraging the pursuit of
meritorious civil rights claims.",8 In addition to these policy concerns,
I See 2002 IRS ANN. REP. TO CONG. 161-66 [hereinafter NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE REPORT] (describing the circuit court split on the issue).
2 Though beyond the scope of this Essay, the AMT will be the cause of much
more wide-ranging tax problems. Because of various structural flaws, this tax, which
was designed to ensure that the extremely rich pay some amount of income tax, will
soon affect a huge number of middle-class taxpayers. See Leonard E. Burman et al.,
The AMT: Projections and Problems, 100 TAX NOTES 105 (July 7, 2003) (projecting
that by 2010 one-third of all taxpayers and 92% of households with income between
$100,000 and $500,000 will be subject to the AMT).
3 See Gregg D. Polsky, A Correct Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Contingent
Attorney's Fee Arrangements: Enough with the Fruits and Trees, 37 GA. L. REV. 57, 64-
67 (2002) (describing the impact of AMT in these cases). For a discussion of the types
of cases in which this problem may arise see id. at 60 n.9. Most commonly, the
problem arises in employment related lawsuits, such as age or sex discrimination.
4 I use the term "net recovery" to mean the plaintiff's pre-tax recovery after
paying attorney's fees and costs.
5 Kenseth v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 399,425-26 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting).
6 Id.
7 See Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phaseouts and Floors in the
Individual Income Tax System, 91 TAX NOTES 1415, 1425 (May 28, 2001); Polsky,
supra note 3, at 68-73; James Serven, Oral Argument in Hukkanen-Campbell:
Taxpayer's Last Stand?, 93 TAX NOTES 854, 859 (Nov. 5, 2001); Robert W. Wood,
Even Tax Court Itself Divided on Attorneys' Fee Issue!, 88 TAX NOTES 573, 573 (July
24, 2000).
8 Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines Civil Rights
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the trap has resulted in a significant amount of tax litigation,9 with
plaintiffs attempting to avoid the onerous tax results by making
creative, though mostly unsuccessful, arguments.' ° The solution to
these problems is quite simple: Congress should amend the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) to allow attorney's fees expended in the
pursuit of a taxable recovery to be fully deductible for AMT
purposes." However, to date Congress has not yet seen fit to resolve
the issue, presumably because the victims (i.e., the plaintiffs)12 of this
Law, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1078 (2000). As this article explains, I would hasten to
add that this undermining will occur only if the potential victims become aware of the
AMT trap prior to, or during, their pursuit of the claim. An unknowing victim will
still prosecute the claim only to realize later, when he files his tax return, the
pernicious effects of the trap.
9 See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 164-65
(describing the litigation).
10 See Polsky, supra note 3, at 78-120 (analyzing the plaintiffs argument that the
contingent fee agreement transfers a portion of the underlying claim to the attorney,
and also analyzing the plaintiffs argument that the contingent fee agreement results
in a partnership for tax purposes).
1 See NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 169
(advocating that section 62 be amended to add these deductions to those which are
taken into account in computing the taxpayer's adjusted gross income); see also
Polsky, supra note 3, at 120.
12 Defendants may also be victimized by the tax trap because the trap could raise
the cost of settlement. However, as discussed below, in certain cases the trap may
help defendants by inhibiting the prosecution of some cases or by forcing the plaintiff
into an early, lowball settlement. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text
(describing the pressures that the tax trap may put on plaintiffs). Defendants would
be more directly affected if they were required, pursuant to relevant federal or state
law, to "gross up" plaintiffs for excess taxes resulting from the AMT trap. Only three
reported cases have addressed this gross up issue. In the only case involving federal
law, the plaintiff was unsuccessful in arguing that he was entitled, under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to either a gross up award or an order requiring the
defendant to indemnify him against the adverse tax consequences caused by the AMT
trap. Porter v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21358
(D.D.C. 2003). However in two cases involving the application of state law, the
plaintiff was awarded a gross up for adverse AMT consequences. Blaney v. Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Dist. No. 160, 55 P.3d 1208, 1214-18
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002), rev. granted 69 P.3d 875 (Wash. 2003) (applying the
Washington Law Against Discrimination); Ferrante v. Sciaretta, 2003 N.J. Super.
LEXIS 408, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003) (applying New Jersey's Laws
Against Discrimination). In addition, some federal courts have ordered gross ups for
adverse tax consequences (not involving the AMT) resulting from a lump sum back-
pay award. See O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(ordering gross up under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Sears v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., Co., 749 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1984) (allowing gross
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trap lack sufficient political muscle.
In this Essay, I will not rehash the tax policy and doctrinal issues
associated with the AMT trap. Rather, I will consider the ethical,
fiduciary duty, and malpractice implications of the trap. Specifically, I
will consider the duty of trial lawyers to advise their clients of the
existence of the trap. I conclude that lawyers have both an ethical and
legal duty to inform their clients about the trap at various junctures
during litigation. Perhaps as a result of this duty (and the potential
sanctions and liability exposure in the event of breach), the politically
adept trial lawyers might be able to convince Congress to act
13responsibly and finally fix this mess.
Part I of this Essay sets forth the mechanics of the AMT trap.
Part II discusses two recent non-tax cases that have raised the ethical,
fiduciary duty and malpractice implications of the trap. Part III
analyzes these ethical issues, while Part IV addresses fiduciary duty
and malpractice implications. Part V considers a loose end-what are
the tax consequences to a plaintiff upon prevailing in a fiduciary
duty/malpractice action against her former attorney?
I. THE MECHANICS OF THE AMT TRAP
Assume that Paula settles an employment discrimination claim
for $1,000,000. Pursuant to a contingent fee agreement, $400,000 of
the proceeds go directly to her attorney, and Paula retains the
remaining $600,000.
In most areas of the country, Paula is required to include the full
$1,000,000 in her gross income and take a deduction for the attorney
up under Title VII). But see Dashnaw v. Pena, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
superseded on other grounds by regulation as stated in Rann v. Chao, 346 F.3d 192,
198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (declining to order gross up under Title VII). If plaintiffs were
clearly entitled to gross ups for adverse consequences resulting from the AMT trap,
then plaintiffs would generally be unaffected by the trap, and the ethical, fiduciary
duty and malpractice issues discussed in this Essay would not exist. However, the
right of plaintiffs to such a gross up is uncertain at best under current law; therefore,
this Essay assumes that such a gross up will not be awarded.
13 Several bills have been proposed which would fix the AMT trap in
discrimination cases, but they have not been enacted. See, e.g., the Civil Rights Tax
Relief Act of 2003, S. 557, 108th Cong. (2003). Although these bills would solve the
AMT problem in most cases, the problem would persist in other cases, such as
employment related cases not involving discrimination. In addition, the bills would
do more than just solve the AMT problem; they would exclude all compensatory
damages received by victims of discrimination except for back-pay and front-pay
components. See id.
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fee portion. 4  However, because the $400,000 constitutes a
miscellaneous itemized deduction," the deduction is impaired in
various ways. 6 The most significant impairment is that, for AMT
purposes, the $400,000 is entirely non-deductible.
7
14 The majority rule requiring full inclusion has been followed in the Federal,
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. See Baylin v. United
States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Alexander v. Internal Revenue Service, 72 F.3d
938 (1st Cir. 1995); Raymond v. United States, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 417 (2d Cir.
2004); O'Brien v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963); Young v.
Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001); Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881
(7th Cir. 2001); Hukkanen-Campell v. Commissioner, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (2002). The Ninth Circuit has also followed this rule in
cases where the contingent fee agreement was governed by California or Alaska law,
but has followed the minority rule in cases where the fee agreement was governed by
Oregon law. Compare Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir.
2000) (requiring full inclusion where fee agreement governed by California law), and
Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972
(2001) (requiring full inclusion where fee agreement governed by Alaska law), with
Benaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003) (following minority rule
where fee agreement governed by Oregon law). The minority rule allowing the
exclusion of the contingent fee portion of the award has been followed in the Fifth,
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. See Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119, 125 (5th
Cir. 1959); Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 364 (5th Cir. 2000); Estate of
Clarks v. Commissioner, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000); Banks v. Commissioner, 345
F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003); Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000);
Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2001). However, the basis for
exclusion differed in these minority view cases, with some relying on peculiarities in
state attorney lien law and others using a broader basis. See Polsky, supra note 3, at
74 n.83. It appears that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits allow exclusion regardless of state
attorney lien law. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 364; Banks, 345 F.3d at 384-86. At the same
time the Eleventh Circuit would allow exclusion only if the relevant attorney lien law
operated in a manner sufficiently similar to Alabama's. Davis, 210 F.3d at 1347;
Foster, 249 F.3d at 1279-80. Professor Charles Davenport has suggested that the
plaintiffs affected by the trap should argue that the attorney's fees are not properly
analyzed as a deduction in the first place; rather, he argues that the expenses should
be capitalized into the basis of the cause of action and applied as a basis-offset to the
amount realized pursuant to the settlement or award. Charles Davenport, Why Tort
Legal Fees Are Not Deductible, 97 TAX NOTES 703 (Nov. 4, 2002); see also Charles
Davenport, Capitalization of Legal Fees: Professor Davenport Responds, 97 TAX
NOTES 1237 (Dec. 2, 2002). For a critique of Professor Davenport's capitalization
argument see Brant J. Hellwig, Tax Treatment of Legal Fees: The Debate Continues,
97 TAX NOTES 1235 (Dec. 2, 2002), and Brant J. Hellwig, Davenport's Capitalization
Argument Fails to Convince, 98 TAX NOTES 433 (Jan. 20, 2003).
is I.R.C. § 67.
16 For a full discussion of the various impairments, see Polsky, supra note 3, at
64-67.
17 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i).
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As a result of this AMT treatment, assuming for simplicity
purposes that Paula has no deductions or any other income, Paula
would owe tax of $276,500.18 On the other hand, if Paula were entitled
to exclude the attorney fee portion of the award (and thereby include
only $600,000 in gross income), Paula would owe tax of only $205,985.
The AMT trap thus costs Paula $70,515. As a result, Paula's after-tax
recovery from the litigation is reduced from $394,015 to $323,500.
Accordingly, Paula's effective tax rate on her ultimate recovery is
increased from 34.33% to 46.08%.
The effect of the AMT trap becomes even more significant as the
ratio of Paula's attorney's fees (and costs) to the total settlement
amount increases. For example, assume that, because of significant
litigation costs, $800,000 of the $1,000,000 settlement, rather than
$400,000, go to Paula's attorney. As a result, the AMT trap would
cause Paula to owe $276,500 in taxes, or $76,500 more than her
recovery. In such a case, Paula's effective tax rate on her recovery is a
preposterous 138.25%.' 9
II. Two RECENT NON-TAX CASES
The legal ethics and malpractice implications of the AMT trap
have been raised in two recent non-tax cases. In Jalali v. Root, a
California state appellate decision, an employment discrimination
plaintiff alleged that her lawyer committed malpractice when he gave
20her bad tax advice. When the plaintiff received a settlement offer of
$2.75 million, the lawyer told her that her tax liability resulting from
18 For all tax computations, it is assumed that the settlement was received in
2002, that Paula's taxable year ended December 31, 2002, that Paula has no
dependents, and that she is unmarried.
19 In this case, Paula's tax liability attributable to the settlement would be
greater than the amount of her ultimate recovery. None of the reported tax cases
concerning the AMT trap appear to have involved such a scenario in which a
successful plaintiff ends up paying taxes out of her pocket, and it is unclear how the
Internal Revenue Service (Service) would respond to such a scenario. Perhaps the
Service would make the administrative decision not to seek to recover taxes caused by
the AMT trap in excess of the plaintiff's pre-tax recovery. However, there is
anecdotal evidence in the popular press that the Service is in fact seeking the full
amount of taxes owed resulting from the tax trap. See Adam Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds
Award to Officer in Sex Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 1, at 18 (describing a
case of a successful discrimination plaintiff owing taxes of approximately $100,000
more than her litigation proceeds after payment of attorney's fees and costs).
20 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2003).
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the settlement would be "forty percent of [her] share. 2 ' To back up
this tax advice, the attorney told the plaintiff, "[t]his is my field. I
know what taxes are for discrimination cases., 22 However, because of
the AMT trap, the attorney's advice was erroneous; in fact, the
plaintiff ended up owing $310,000 more in taxes than the attorney had
21
represented.
The plaintiff sued to recover the difference, alleging that the
attorney's erroneous tax advice constituted legal malpractice. 24 At
trial, the jury agreed and awarded the plaintiff the $310,000
difference .25
On appeal, the court specifically did "not address the general
question of whether personal injury lawyers have any duty, under
normal circumstances, to accurately apprise their clients of the tax
implications of any recovery they might obtain for their clients,"
because in the case at hand the attorney "held himself out as
particularly competent to give tax advice in the context of recoveries
in discrimination cases. 26  Nevertheless, the court held for the
attorney because the plaintiff had failed to provide evidence that the
erroneous advice had caused the plaintiff any damages.27 According
to the appellate court, in order to prevail, the plaintiff was required to
prove that, but for the erroneous advice, the plaintiff would have
turned down the $2.75 million offer and ultimately received a larger28
recovery. Because the plaintiff failed to "show that she could have
done better if she hadn't accepted the settlement," the court entered
29judgment for the attorney.
Another recent case is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Shott v.
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center.30  In Shott, an
employment discrimination plaintiff received a jury award of $60,000
in compensatory damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act
21 Id. at 692.
22 Id. at 693.
23 Id. at 692. The plaintiff still ultimately ended up with an after-tax recovery of
roughly $700,000, though she had expected to end up with about $1,000,000. Id. at
696.
24 Id. at 692
2 Id.
26 Id. at 693.
27 Id. at 696.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 695.
30 338 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2003).
2004]
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(ADA).3 The plaintiff thereafter filed a petition for attorney's fees
under the ADA. and was awarded approximately $430,000 in
attorney's fees and CoStS.
32
The defendant challenged the award based on a pre-trial
settlement offer by the defendant that was rejected by the plaintiff.3
The Seventh Circuit had previously held that, in awarding attorney's
fees to a prevailing plaintiff under the ADA, fees accumulated after
the plaintiff rejects a "substantial offer" could be disregarded.34 An
offer is substantial for this purpose if "the offered amount appears to
be roughly equal to or more than the total damages recovered by the
prevailing party.,
35
The pre-trial offer by the defendant was to allow the plaintiff to
change job positions and remain at her current salary for the
remainder of the year.36 The offer did not include any payments for
damages, attorney's fees, or costs. 37  The defendant argued that,
because of the AMT trap, this pre-trial offer was better for the
plaintiff than the jury award plus the attorney's fees. 38 According to
the defendant, as a result of the judgment, the plaintiff would owe
taxes of $125,644, or $65,644 more than the $60,000 she actually
received. In other words, using after-tax dollars, the plaintiff would
have been better off settling for zero dollars rather than winning the
trial and owing $65,644 out-of-pocket.
The court rejected the defendant's argument on evidentiary
grounds, emphasizing that "none of the information upon which [the
defendant] relies in purporting to calculate [the plaintiff's] tax liability
is in the record."3 9 More importantly, the court suggested in dicta
that, for purposes of determining whether a rejected offer is
substantial, only pre-tax dollars should be considered:
Furthermore, though we need not decide this issue now, we
doubt that it would be appropriate for this court to establish a
precedent wherein attorneys would be required to know the
tax status of their clients before accepting or rejecting a
31 Id. at 739.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 743.
34 Moriarty v. Svec, 233 F.3d 955, 967 (7th Cir. 2000).
35 Id.
36 Shott, 338 F.3d at 743.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 744.
39 Id.
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settlement offer or wherein courts would routinely have to
delve into the tax records of the parties to determine an
appropriate fee award ... [F]ee litigation already places a
"heavy burden" on the federal courts; adding a requirement
to calculate the tax status of the parties would only increase
that burden .
The italicized language above shows that the court was aware of the
potential malpractice and ethical issues created by the tax trap. At the
time of the settlement offer, should the plaintiffs attorney have
advised his client of the adverse consequences resulting from the
AMT trap? Should this tax advice have been given at the time the
plaintiff chose to file her petition for statutory attorney's fees? Should
it have been given at the inception of the case? These issues and
others are discussed below.
III. ETHICAL ISSUES
This Part examines whether the tax trap implicates ethical issues.
For purposes of the analysis of this part, it is assumed that the
attorney is aware of the tax trap and the fact that it may subject the
client to an extremely high rate of tax (possibly in excess of 100
percent) on the client's net recovery. Subpart A considers potential
conflicts of interest for a lawyer with knowledge, while Subpart B
discusses such a lawyer's ethical obligations to inform the client of the
effect of the trap.
A. Conflict of Interest
Under the ABA Model Rules, a conflict of interest exists if "there
is a significant risk that the representation of [a client] will be
materially limited... by a personal interest of the lawyer., 42 The
conflict that arises from the tax trap may occur at various junctures
during the attorney-client relationship. In each of these cases, it is in
the attorney's personal best interests not to disclose the existence of
the tax trap, while it is in the client's best interests to consider the
40 The Shott court's reluctance to place a duty on trial lawyers with regard to
their client's tax issues is reminiscent of the California Supreme Court's holding in
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 (1961), that as a matter of law, it is not negligent for a
lawyer to misunderstand the rule against perpetuities.
41 Shott, 338 F.3d at 744 (emphasis added).
42 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7(a) (2003).
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effect of the trap in making crucial litigation decisions.
1. Juncture #1: Taking the Case
Assume that a client approaches a lawyer with a solid
employment discrimination or civil rights case that, if successful,
would result in a small award of damages relative to the probable
amount of attorney's fees and costs that it will generate (a "low
value/high fee case"). Such a case is an ideal situation for a huge
AMT trap, because the ratio of attorney's fees to the overall recovery
will be quite high. As a result, a potential conflict arises between the
attorney, who wants to take the case and obtain his fees, and the
client, who might be better off avoiding litigation because the AMT
trap may consume the entire recovery (and, possibly, money out of
her pocket).
Even in cases in which the legal fees will not represent such a
large part of the overall recovery, a plaintiff may decide to avoid
litigation if she is aware of the tax trap. If the plaintiff is conflicted
about instigating the litigation because, for example, she is concerned
about the distraction and stress of litigation, the extra tax burden
caused by the tax trap may be enough to cause the plaintiff to drop
the case to the detriment of the attorney's personal financial interests.
2. Juncture #2: Settlement Offers
Now assume that, in another low value/high fee case, a very early
lowball settlement offer is made by the defendant. Once again, a
conflict arises. The attorney would be better off if the client rejects
the offer, thereby maximizing his fee recovery. However, the client
may be better off accepting the lowball offer, thereby possibly
avoiding the AMT trap altogether.43 In analyzing the merits of the
settlement offer, an informed client would consider the possibility that
the trap may cause her to pay taxes out of her pocket or the possibility
that the tax trap might consume a large portion of a subsequent larger
settlement. Therefore, if the client is fully aware of the tax trap, the
likelihood is greater that she will accept the lowball offer to the
detriment of the attorney's personal financial interests.
43 Accepting an early lowball offer may avoid implicating the AMT trap for two
reasons. First, the settlement may be too small to trigger the AMT. Second, if the
claim triggered a fee-shifting statute, an early settlement will avoid the incurrence of a
significant amount of attorney's fees (when viewed in relation to the plaintiff's net
recovery), thereby avoiding the tax trap.
[Vol. 23:615
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3. Juncture #3: The Motion for Fees
In many situations in which the tax trap may arise, there is a
statute that allows a victorious plaintiff to petition the court to award
attorney's fees.44  In a typical case, a contingent fee agreement
provides that the attorney will receive the greater of (a) some
percentage of the overall recovery (possibly including court-awarded
attorney's fees) or (b) the amount of court-awarded attorney's fees.
In some cases in which (b) would be higher than (a), it actually may be
in the client's best interests not to petition for attorney's fees.4 1 Of
course, this is in conflict with the personal financial interests of the
attorney, who wants to maximize his fees.
Take the Shott case, for example. If the plaintiff had waived the
right to petition for fees, the attorney would have taken his
percentage share of the $60,000 damages and the plaintiff would have
avoided the tax trap.46 However, by petitioning for fees, the plaintiff
has put herself in a position to owe $65,644 more in taxes than she
recovers.
It would appear that the solution under the ABA Model Rules is
for the attorney to advise the client of the existence and effect of the
AMT trap and of the potential conflict, and to obtain informed
consent in writing to continue the representation notwithstanding theS47
conflict, at each of these three critical junctures. It would probably
also be prudent for the attorney to strongly advise the client to seek
" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2003) (providing for court-awarded attorney's
fees to a prevailing party under the ADA).
45 It is clear that the decision to petition for fees rests with the client, not the
attorney. See id. (providing for fees to the prevailing party); Sinyard, 268 F.3d at 759
(recognizing that fee awards belong to the client, not the lawyer, under fee shifting
statutes).
46 The plaintiff would have avoided the tax trap because, regardless of the
attorney's share of the $60,000 recovery, the AMT would not have been triggered at
such a low level of gross income.
47 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7(b) (2003) (providing that certain
conflicts of interest may be waived by the client through informed consent); id. R.
1.0(e) (defining "informed consent" as consent "after the lawyer has communicated
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct"). Certain conflicts, those
which inherently prevent competent and diligent representation, cannot be waived.
Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 15 (2003). However, the AMT trap probably does not create such a
nonconsentable conflict, because the interests of the client should be adequately
protected with informed consent. Id. Furthermore, if the trap is deemed to create a
nonconsentable conflict, it might be impossible for the client to obtain representation
in the litigation.
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• 48
independent tax advice from a tax professional.
In the context of Juncture #3 (the decision to petition for
statutory fees), the attorney might also consider restructuring the
contingent fee agreement to ensure that the client will not be in a
worse after-tax position after receiving court-awarded fees than
before. This could be done by reapportioning the total recovery
between lawyer and client to ensure that client receives at least as
many after-tax dollars as she would have in the absence of the motion
for fees. Of course, the attorney may hesitate to offer such a
restructuring, which effectively takes dollars out of his pocket and
puts them in the government's coffers.
B. Keeping the Client Reasonably Informed
ABA Model Rule 1.4(b) requires a lawyer to "explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation., 49 Pursuant to this duty, the
lawyer must explain the potential benefits and burdens that may result
from a particular course of action, so that the client has "sufficient
information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation., 50
At all three of the various junctures identified above (i.e.,
initiating the litigation, considering settlement offers, and deciding
whether to petition for fees), a client must be informed of the
existence and effect of the AMT trap in order to appreciate fully the
risks and rewards of potential courses of action. For example, in the
context of deciding whether to initiate litigation, the client should be
apprised of the risk that the AMT trap may reduce substantially the
amount of her after-tax recovery and the risk that she may be forced
to pay taxes attributable to the litigation in excess of her ultimate
recovery. Only after considering these risks can the client make an
intelligent decision about whether to undertake litigation.
48 Cf. In Re Conduct of Bishop, 297 Or. 479, 487 (1984) (holding that, where
attorney enters into business transaction with client, attorney must advise client to
seek independent counsel); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in
Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405,
507-09 (contending that "if law firms desire to invest in their clients, they should
require that their clients seek the advice of independent counsel before proceeding
with the arrangement").
49 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2003).
50 Id. 1.4(b) cmt. 5; see also In re Winkel, 577 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Wis. 1998)
(attorney's failure to advise client about risk of criminal prosecution from a course of
action constituted an ethical breach).
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IV. FIDUCIARY DUTY & MALPRACTICE IMPLICATIONS
The ethical rules discussed above require a lawyer with
knowledge to advise his clients of the AMT trap's effects at certain
critical junctures during the litigation. This Part considers the
fiduciary duty and malpractice implications of the trap. Although
courts have consistently held that a legal ethics violation is not by itself
a breach of fiduciary duty or the appropriate standard of care,5 courts
have generally found that an ethics violation may be used as evidence
in legal actions against attorneys.52
A. The Fiduciary Duties of a Lawyer with Knowledge
An agent has a fiduciary duty "to treat his principal with the
utmost candor, rectitude, care, loyalty and good faith-in fact to treat
the principal as well as the agent would treat himself."53 In the
51 See, e.g., Astarte, Inc. v. Pac. Indus. Sys., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 693, 706 (D. Colo.
1994); Coleman v. Hicks, 433 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Nagy v. Beckley,
578 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Maritrans G.P. Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton &
Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1284 (Pa. 1992); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
pmbl. 20. (2003) ("Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action
against a lawyer...").
52 See, e.g., RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 58 F. Supp.
2d 503, 525 (D.N.J. 1999); Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d 297, 301 (Alaska 1997);
Mirabito v. Liccardo, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 1992); Waldman v. Levine,
544 A.2d 683, 690-91 (D.C. 1988); Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C.,
453 S.E.2d 719, 721 (Ga. 1995); Mayol v. Summers, Watson & Kimpel, 585 N.E.2d
1176, 1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Sargent v. Buckley, 697 A.2d 1272, 1275 (Me. 1997);
Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1986); Welsh v. Case, 43 P.3d 445,
452 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); McNair v. Rainsford, 499 S.E.2d 488, 494 (S.C. Ct. App.
1998) (each holding that an ethical violation may be used as evidence of a lawyer's
duty to his client). See also Hart v. Comerica Bank, 957 F. Supp. 958, 981 (E.D. Mich.
1997) (holding that an ethical violation creates a rebuttable presumption that lawyer
committed malpractice). But see Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (Wash. 1992)
(holding that, although an expert could consider ethics rules in developing an opinion
about standard of care, ethics rules are not admissible in action against attorney);
Lazy Seven Coal Sales Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C., 813 S.W. 2d 400, 407 (Tenn. 1991)
(same); Orsini v. Larry Moyer Trucking, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Ark. 1992)
(holding that an ethics violation is simply irrelevant in action against attorney and
may not be used for any purpose); Harrington v. Pailthorp, 841 P.2d 1258, 1262
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So.2d
1205, 1215-16 (Miss. 1996) (same).
53 Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).
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context of an attorney-client relationship, a lawyer owes a fiduciary
duty "to represent the client with undivided loyalty.., and to disclose
any material matters infringing upon th[is] obligation[]. '54  As
explained above, the AMT trap may infringe upon the lawyer's
undivided loyalty to the client, particularly in low value/high fee cases.
As a result of the trap, an attorney's personal best interests in
maximizing his fee recovery may be at odds with the client's best
interests of avoiding the pernicious effects of the trap. Therefore, in
cases in which this conflict could arise, an attorney with knowledge
has a fiduciary duty to advise the client of the trap and its effects, as
well as the conflict of interest it creates.55
An attorney who fails to advise the client of this conflict is liable
for damages consisting of two components. First, the attorney is liable
to the extent the failure to advise of the AMT trap has caused the
client actual damages. This causation issue is discussed below in the
discussion of legal malpractice law. 0
Second, even in the absence of actual damages, the attorney may
be required to forfeit all or a part of the fee paid by the client. As a
56result, unlike in the malpractice context, a lawyer may be liable for
damages in a fiduciary action even if the client cannot show that the
lawyer's breach actually caused any harm.5 ' The amount of the fee
54 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 14.1, at
227 (4th ed. 1996).
55 Although the scope of fiduciary and legal malpractice law overlap
significantly, see Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1137, 1162-67 (1999), I limit my analysis of fiduciary law to cases in which a lawyer has
knowledge of the AMT trap and my analysis of malpractice law to cases in which a
lawyer lacks such knowledge.
56 See infra Part IV.B.2.
57 See Duncan, supra note 55, at 1160-61. The Supreme Court of Texas recently
explained the policy behind allowing damages for fiduciary duty violations even in the
absence of actual harm:
It is the agent's disloyalty, not any resulting harm, that violates the fiduciary
relationship and thus impairs the basis for compensation. An agent's
compensation is not only for specific results but also for loyalty. Removing
the disincentive of forfeiture except when harm results would prompt an
agent to attempt to calculate whether particular conduct, though disloyal to
the principal, might nevertheless be harmless to the principal and profitable
to the agent. The main purpose of forfeiture is not to compensate an
injured principal, even though it may have that effect. Rather, the central
purpose of the equitable remedy of forfeiture is to protect relationships of
trust by discouraging agents' disloyalty.
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forfeiture (i.e., whether full or partial and, if partial, what amount)
depends on the facts and circumstances of the breach, including "the
gravity and timing of the violation, its willfulness, its effect on the
value of the lawyer's work for the client, any other threatened or
actual harm to the client, and the adequacy of other remedies."' 8
B. Malpractice Implications
The discussion thus far has assumed that a lawyer has knowledge
of the trap and has concluded that such a lawyer has both an ethical
and fiduciary duty to advise his client of the trap. This subpart
considers the case of the "unknowing lawyer," one who is simply
unaware of the trap. Therefore, unlike the previous discussion, which
considered the duty of loyalty to the client, this subpart considers the
duty of care and asks the question: "Does a trial lawyer have a duty to
know about and understand the AMT trap and its potential effect on
plaintiffs?" Or, to put the matter a bit differently: "Is it negligent for
a trial lawyer to be unaware of the tax trap?"
1. The Standard of Care
In representing a client, an "attorney should exercise the skill and
knowledge ordinarily possessed by attorneys under similar
circumstances."5 9 Accordingly, the key issue is whether attorneys who
prosecute employment discrimination and civil rights cases ordinarily
appreciate the existence and effect of the AMT trap. In general,
plaintiffs attempt to prove standard of care by introducing expert
testimony by practitioners in the same field as the defendant lawyer.
60
Consequently, a plaintiff subject to the AMT trap would attempt to
introduce expert testimony that most trial lawyers litigating cases such
as the plaintiff's are fully aware of the existence of the trap. The
standard of care issue is a question of fact, and ultimately will be
decided by a jury.
Even if it is proven that most similarly situated lawyers know
about the AMT trap, the defendant lawyer may argue that, as a
Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. 1999).
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996); see also Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 241-42 (adopting the restatement's
standard).
59 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 54, § 18.2, at 551 (emphasis in original
omitted). See generally id. § 18.3 (discussing the bounds of competence).
60 Id. § 18.4.
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matter of law, he simply has no duty to know about the intricacies of
the Code. The defendant would argue that, in agreeing to prosecute
the client's claim, his obligation was only to litigate the cause of action
and provide the client with the best possible result, without
consideration of tax consequences. The defendant might point out
that he never explicitly indicated or suggested that he would render
tax advice and argue that personal income tax issues are inherently
personal-or to state the argument more bluntly, the plaintiff's
personal tax issues are her problems, not the attorney's. In fact, the
contingent fee agreement might expressly carve out any obligation to
render tax advice.61 As a result, the defendant would argue, tax issuesS 62
were outside of the agreed scope of his representation.
This argument should fail for two reasons. First, there is no
reason to define a trial lawyer's duty so narrowly. The negative tax
consequences resulting from the AMT trap constitute adverse legal
consequences arising directly from the litigation overseen by the
attorney. As a result, it is hard to see how advice relating to these tax
consequences can be outside the scope of representation.
Second, even if one accepts the notion that tax consequences are
outside of the explicit scope of the representation, courts have
generally held that a lawyer may have "peripheral duties" to his client.
For example, in Nichols v. Keller, a California appellate court held
that a lawyer handling a client's worker's compensation claim may
have a duty to advise the client regarding other claims against third
parties even if the lawyer expressly limits the scope of
representation:
61 Although the ABA Model Rules allow a lawyer to limit the scope of
representation, the limitation must "be reasonable under the circumstances" and the
client must agree to the limitation after giving informed consent. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2003).
62 The Shott court, though it did not decide the issue, appeared to be amenable
to this argument. In dicta, it "doubt[ed] that it would be appropriate for this court to
establish a precedent wherein attorneys would be required to know the tax status of
their clients before accepting or rejecting a settlement offer." 338 F.3d at 744.
However, the Shott court misunderstood the nature of the AMT trap. Imposing a
duty on employment discrimination and civil rights plaintiffs lawyers would not
require them "to know the tax status of their clients." Id. All they would need to
know was that the AMT trap exists, that it may adversely affect their clients
(particularly in low value/high fee cases), and that their clients should seek
independent tax advice at critical junctures.
63 For example, the client may have tort claims against persons other than the
employer for negligence, medical malpractice, or products liability.
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Generally speaking, a workers' compensation attorney should
be able to limit the retention to the compensation claim if the
client is cautioned (1) there may be other remedies which the
attorney will not investigate, and (2) other counsel should be
consulted on such matters. However, even when a retention
is expressly limited, the attorney may still have a duty to alert
the client to legal problems which are reasonably apparent,
even though they fall outside the scope of the retention. The
rationale is that, as between the lay client and the attorney,
the latter is more qualified to recognize and analyze the
client's legal needs. The attorney need not represent the
client on such matters. Nevertheless, the attorney should
inform the client of the limitations of the attorney's
representation and of the possible need for other counsel.
64
The reasoning by the Nichols court applies equally in the context of
the AMT trap. As between the lay client and the attorney, the
attorney is more qualified to know about, and appreciate the
draconian effects of, the trap. As a result, the argument that no duty
exists as a matter of law for a trial lawyer to advise his client of the
65AMT trap is not persuasive.
2. Causation & Damages
Unlike in a breach of fiduciary duty action, a client must show
that the lawyer's malpractice caused actual damages in order to
recover. Therefore, as the Jalali court held, the client must show that,
had the appropriate information about the AMT trap been conveyed,
the client would have done better.66
In the AMT trap context, causation might be very easy to prove in
64 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
65 See also Int'l Tele-Marine Corp. v. Malone & Assocs., 845 F. Supp. 1427, 1433
(D. Colo. 1994) ("[Elven though an attorney can limit the scope of the representation,
one cannot disregard circumstances which provide reasonable notice that the client
may have legal problems or remedies which fall outside the scope of the
undertaking."); Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)
(unwilling to hold that a personal injury lawyer has "absolutely no duties to his client
with regard to a medical malpractice action simply because the written contract did
not specifically mention a malpractice suit," because "[t]o do so would require the
client, presumably a layman who is unskilled in the law, to recognize for himself all
potential legal remedies").
66 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 699-700, as modified on denial of reh'g, 2003 WL 21536965
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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a low value/high fee case in which the client ends up owing more in
taxes than her recovery (net of attorney's fees). Assume that, as a
result of the AMT trap, the client ends up owing $100,000 in taxes out
of her pocket (i.e., in excess of net recovery). In such a case, the client
would need to show that, had the information about the AMT trap
been given, she would have decided not to litigate the case. If she can
prove this, she would recover the $100,000 of taxes she was forced to
67pay out-of-pocket.
However, in cases in which the AMT trap merely increases the
tax rate applied to the client's recovery to a rate less than one hundred
percent so that the client does end up with some after-tax recovery,
causation is much harder, if not impossible, to prove. For example, in
the Jalali case, the court held that, in order for Jalali to prevail, she
would have to prove that, had the attorney correctly apprised her of
the tax consequences, she would have (1) rejected the $2.75 million
settlement offer, and (2) ultimately settled, or received a collectible
68judgment, for an amount greater than $2.75 million. In essence, in
addition to proving malpractice, she would have to try the underlying
case and show that she could have done better. Absent some
evidence that the trial lawyer's conduct fell below the standard of care
in some other respect, there is no reason to think that, in cases where
the effective tax rate is less than one hundred percent, the client could
have done better had she been aware of the AMT trap.
V. A LOOSE END-TAX TREATMENT OF MALPRACTICE AWARDS
Assume that the plaintiff in Jalali had prevailed on appeal and
ultimately recovered $310,000 from her former attorney (or the
attorney's malpractice insurance company). Would this $310,000 be
taxable to Jalali? 69 This section considers this question.
In arguing that this amount is excluded from gross income, Jalali
would make two arguments. The first is that the amount represents a
67 It may be difficult for the plaintiff to prove that, had she been fully aware of
the tax trap, she would not have litigated the case. After all, at the time she would
decide whether or not to go forward, she would not know the amount of litigation
expenses. However, in cases in which the compensatory damages will likely be
nominal, it may be fairly easy for the plaintiff to show that the risk of implicating the
tax trap would have been sufficient to cause her to drop the case.
68 Jalali, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 696.
69 Ironically, if this amount is taxable, Jalali may be subject to the AMT trap
again, depending on the amount she must pay to her own attorney in the malpractice
claim.
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tax-free recovery of capital under the 1939 case of Clark v.
Commissioner.0 The second is that the amount represents a refund of
attorney's fees previously paid to the attorney, which did not give rise
to any tax benefit and are thus excluded from gross income by virtue
of the exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule in section 111(a).
A. The Clark Case
In Clark, the taxpayer paid an excessive amount of federal taxes
because his tax counsel negligently failed to advise him to file a
separate return, rather than a joint return with his wife. This
negligence caused the taxpayer to pay approximately $20,000 more in
federal taxes than he would have paid had he filed a separate return.
The taxpayer ultimately recovered this excess from his tax counsel,
and the issue in Clark was whether this amount was required to be
included in the taxpayer's gross income. In a brief and conclusory
opinion, the Board of Tax Appeals held that the taxpayer could
exclude the excess tax payment because it represented "compensation
for a loss which impaired [the taxpayer's] capital."7
On its face, Jalali's $310,000 hypothetical recovery is similar to
Clark's recovery. Each is based on a lawyer's negligence and its
impact on the taxpayer's federal tax liability. However, these cases
are distinguishable. In Clark, the taxpayer truly paid too much tax
because of negligent advice-simply by electing to file a separate
return, Clark's tax liability would have been reduced. However, Jalali
could do nothing to reduce her tax liability-there was no way to
structure the settlement to avoid the AMT trap. Simply put, Jalali
paid no excess taxes.
Although the analogy to Clark is not strong with respect to Jalali's
hypothetical recovery, the analogy is much stronger with regard to a
case in which the taxpayer ends up owing more in taxes than her
recovery net of attorney's fees. For example, assume that a plaintiff
ends up owing $100,000 in taxes in excess of her net recovery. If the
plaintiff recovers this $100,000 excess from her lawyer, the Clark rule
of exclusion may be applicable. In this case, the plaintiff arguably
paid excess taxes, since she could have avoided the $100,000 tax
liability simply by not prosecuting the case. Like the taxpayer in
Clark, the plaintiff ends up owing too much tax because of her
counsel's negligent advice.
70 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939).
71 Id. at 335.
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However, it is unclear whether the Clark rule should be
interpreted so broadly. Professor Lawrence Zelenak has argued that
the rule of exclusion in Clark should be limited to cases in which the
taxpayer paid too much tax based on the non-tax facts of the1 2
taxpayer's transactions. While Clark overpaid his taxes based on the
non-tax facts due to a failure to make an election for tax purposes, the
plaintiff in the instant hypothetical paid the correct amount of tax
based on the non-tax facts. The Service, in a series of recent private
letter rulings, appears to agree with Professor Zelenak's conclusion,
ruling that exclusion under Clark is warranted only where taxpayers
"pay more than their minimum proper federal income tax liabilities
based on the underlying transactions for the years in question."73
Under this view, Clark's rule of exclusion would not apply even in
cases in which the AMT trap caused the plaintiff to owe more in tax
than her net recovery.
B. The Tax Benefit Rule
In addition to the unconvincing Clark argument, a fiduciary
duty/malpractice plaintiff could argue that the damages she received
represent a refund of attorney's fees previously paid and, as a result,
that the damages are excluded from gross income pursuant to the
72 Lawrence Zelenak, The Taxation of Tax Indemnity Payments: Recovery of
Capital and the Contours of Gross Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 381, 397-03 (1991).
73 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-43-034 (July 28, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-43-035 (July 28,
1997). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-28-052 (Apr. 16 1997) (ruling that Clark applies only
to cases in which a mistake causes "taxpayers to pay more than their minimum proper
federal income tax liabilities based on the underlying transactions for the years in
question"); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-33-007 (May 13, 1998) (same); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-28-
033 (Apr. 8, 2003) (applying Clark to case in which taxpayer had paid an amount of
tax greater than that which was required to be paid as a result of employer's
erroneous classification, because the taxpayer had paid "more than his minimum
proper federal tax liability"). However, courts have sometimes suggested that Clark
might not be interpreted so narrowly. See Centex Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl.
381, 388-89 (2003) (concluding that government's reimbursement of taxpayer's tax
benefits lost due to federal legislation that breached the government's contractual
obligations to taxpayer would be excluded from taxpayer's gross income); Concord
Instruments Corp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3036 (1994) (holding that
payment from taxpayer's former attorney resulting from attorney's failure to timely
appeal adverse Tax Court judgment was excluded from taxpayer's gross income under
Clark). For a discussion of these two cases, see Burgess J.W. Raby & William L.
Raby, Excludability of Tax Loss Reimbursements, 100 TAx NOTES 1689 (Sept. 29,
2003).
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exclusionary component of the tax benefit rule in section 111(a).74
Section 111(a) provides that an exclusion for a "recovery of any
amount deducted in any prior taxable year to the extent such amount
did not reduce the amount of [income] tax" owed in such prior taxable
year.
As the Supreme Court has explained, the tax benefit rule was
designed to mitigate the potentially harsh effects of the tax system's
annual accounting principle:
An annual accounting system is a practical necessity if the
federal income tax is to produce revenue ascertainable and
payable at regular intervals. Nevertheless, strict adherence to
an annual accounting system would create transactional
inequities. For instance, if a taxpayer held a note that became
apparently uncollectible early in the taxable year, but the
debtor made an unexpected financial recovery before the
close of the year and paid the debt, the transaction would
have no tax consequences. If, however, the debtor's financial
recovery and the resulting repayment took place after the
close of the taxable year, the taxpayer would have a
deduction for the apparently bad debt in the first year under
Section 166(a) of the Code. Without the tax benefit rule, the
repayment in the second year, representing a return of
capital, would not be taxable. The second transaction, then,
although economically identical to the first, could, because of
the differences in accounting, yield drastically different tax
75
consequences.
The tax benefit rule would generally require that the repayment in the
76
second year be included in income, thereby "achiev[ing] rough
transactional parity in tax., 77 However, if the taxpayer realized no
74 See Patricia D. White, An Essay on the Conceptual Foundations of the Tax
Benefit Rule, 82 MICH. L. REV. 486, 488 (1983) (describing the inclusionary and
exclusionary components of the tax benefit rule).
75 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 377 (1983) (citations
omitted).
76 I.R.C. § 111(a).
77 Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 383. The transactional parity is "rough" primarily
because the taxpayer's marginal tax rates could be different between years one and
two. See id. at 380 n.12. Even with stable marginal tax rates, the time value of money
would prevent perfect transactional equivalence under section 111(a) because the
amount included in year two is not adjusted to reflect the time value of money benefit
the taxpayer received by taking the earlier deduction.
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benefit from the deduction in year one, the exclusionary aspect of the
tax benefit rule would, consistent with this notion of transactional
parity, allow the taxpayer to exclude the repayment in year two from
gross income.
Turning to the application of the tax benefit rule to a successful
fiduciary duty/malpractice claimant, assume that a claimant is paid
$300,000 of damages from her former attorney. Assume further that
the fee previously paid to the former attorney equaled $1,000,000. In
order to exclude the $300,000 from gross income under the tax benefit
rule, the plaintiff would have to show that $300,000 constituted a
"recovery" of a portion of the $1,000,000 fee originally paid to the
attorney for purposes of section 111(a).
If this characterization of the $300,000 damages as a recovery of
attorney's fee paid were to prevail, the claimant could exclude the
damages from gross income under the tax benefit rule. Although the
attorney's fee amount was deductible in the year of settlement, the
claimant would have received no tax benefit from the deduction
because the entire deduction was disallowed in computing her AMT
liability."
Therefore, the key question is whether the $300,000 of damages is
properly characterized as a partial recovery of attorney's fees paid.
The damages will be considered a recovery only if there is a sufficient
relationship between the damages and the attorney's fees so that
"they can be considered as parts of one and the same transaction.
7 1
The resolution of this issue may depend on the theory under
which the damages were recovered. Recall that, if the claimant
proved that the attorney violated his fiduciary duties, the claimant
may be awarded (in addition to any actual damages) all or a portion of
the fees previously paid to the attorney. The theory underlying this
disgorgement of fees is that, by breaching his fiduciary duties, the
attorney did not really "earn" the fees. As a result, it appears that any
such disgorgement of fees by the attorney back to the claimant should
be treated as a refund of excess fees, which would be excludible under
the tax benefit rule. Therefore, if the $300,000 of damages (or any
portion thereof) were received under a disgorgement of fee theory,
the $300,000 (of such relevant portion) should be excluded from the
claimant's gross income.
However, if the claimant is awarded an amount as actual damages
78 See supra Part I (discussing of AMT treatment of attorney fees).
79 Am. Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 506, 510 (1979) (quoting Farr v.
Commissioner, 11 T.C. 552, 567 (1948)).
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pursuant to either a fiduciary duty or malpractice claim, the argument
that these damages are a recovery for purposes of section 111(a) is
much less persuasive.0 Unlike in the case of fee disgorgement, there
is no direct nexus between the fees paid and the actual damages. In
the context of actual damages, the amount of fees paid is irrelevant-
actual damages can be awarded well in excess of the fees paid; in fact,
damages can be awarded even if no fee was charged by the attorney.
Simply put, when proving actual damages, the amount of attorney's
fees previously paid by the claimant is entirely irrelevant.
On the other hand, the operation of the AMT trap necessarily ties
the amount of actual damages to the amount of the attorney's fees
paid. Mathematically, actual damages can never exceed the amount
of fees paid, and the AMT trap will never occur in cases in which no
fee is paid.8' Perhaps this nexus might be sufficient to treat an award
of actual damages as a partial refund of fees paid. If so, a recovery of
actual damages attributable to the AMT trap would be excluded from
gross income pursuant to section 111(a).
VI. CONCLUSION
Recently, the AMT trap has been a pervasive nuisance for tax
practitioners and federal judges, and especially for victims with
employment discrimination and civil rights claims. In this Essay, I
demonstrate that the trap creates very significant ethical, fiduciary
duty and malpractice issues for lawyers handling these sorts of claims.
A lawyer with knowledge of the AMT trap has an ethical and
fiduciary duty to explain the impact of the trap at various critical
junctures of the litigation so that the client can make informed
decisions. In particular, the AMT trap puts lawyers handling low
value/high fee cases in quite an awkward position because of the
conflict of interests the trap creates. In addition, trial lawyers without
knowledge of the AMT trap may commit malpractice if similarly
situated lawyers are aware of the trap. However, the causation
requirement of malpractice claims may preclude liability with respect
to an unknowing lawyer except in cases in which the AMT trap causes
the client's effective tax rate to exceed one hundred percent on her
recovery.
80 The analysis below applies equally to amounts received as actual damages
under a fiduciary duty claim.
81 See Polsky, supra note 3, at 68 (noting that the AMT trap effectively taxes the
plaintiff on a portion of the fees which are paid to the attorney); Wood, supra note 7,
at 573 (same).
2004]
638 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 23:615
As commentators have discussed, the optimal solution is to
amend the Code to fix the statutory flaw giving rise to the AMT trap.
Despite pleas to fix the Code from tax practitioners and academics,
Congress has not yet acted. Perhaps if the trial lawyers began to
appreciate their duties to advise their clients fully of the trap, as well
as their potential exposure to liability, these lawyers might be
motivated to use their political clout to encourage Congress to fix the
AMT trap.
